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PARTIES 
The only parties to this action are those named in the caption. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2A-3(c), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), to hear this appeal from the Small Claims 
Division of the Circuit Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the judge pro tern of 
the Small Claims Division of the Circuit Court in a civil action for a 
deficiency judgment. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the pro tern judge commit clear error by failing to recuse 
himself since he had previously represented the Plaintiffs in that he had 
appeared as Sandy City Prosecutor in cases in which they were his chief 
witnesses? 
2. Did the judge pro tern err in sanctioning or condoning the 
Plaintiffs' self-help enforcement of a non-existent security interest with 
respect to equipment that they had previously sold to Plaintiff? 
3. Did the trial judge err in failing to recognize that the 
Plaintiffs were estopped to assert Defendant's technical default under the 
verbal contract of sale since (i) Plaintiffs and their agents had twice before 
rejected Defendant's tender of the full remaining purchase price and (ii) 
Defendant was only one month and four days delinquent with respect to the 
July 10, 1987, payment when the Plaintiffs "repossessed" the equipment on 
August 14, 1987, even though, by Plaintiffs' own testimony, Defendant had 
frequently been 60 to 90 days delinquent on his payments and no previous 
demand for payment had been made by the Plaintiffs prior to their 
"repossession" of the equipment. 
4. Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a valid security interest, 
were Plaintiffs precluded from a deficiency judgment until such time as there 
had been a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
No statute per se mandates a judge's recusal when, as in the 
present case, a party was a favorable witness in a case in which the now 
judge was then counsel. However, Canon 2, Canon 3 (Subpart C) Section 
78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and Rule 63(b) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure are helpful in the analysis of this issue. These 
authorities are reproduced in the Addendum, infra, at A-l through A-5. 
No statute or common law of the state of Utah permits a 
"repossession" of personal property as to which the vendor (/.&, Plaintiffs) 
have failed to retain a security interest. Since there was no written contract 
in this case, as required by Sections 70A-2-201 and 70A-9-203, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), there could be no security interest as defined 
in Section 70A-1-201(37) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), and 
Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. While the "savings" provision of 
Section 70A-2-201(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), may allow the 
enforceability of a verbal contract, it does not sanction the enforcement of a 
nonexistent security interest. These statutes are reproduced in the 
Addendum, infra at A-6 through A-9. 
Sections 70A-9-504 and 70A-9-505(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), govern the disposition of collateral and the rights and 
responsibilities of the creditors after repossession. These statutes are 
reproduced in the Addendum, infra at A-10 through A-ll. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
A hearing was held on November 18, 1987, in the Small Claims 
Division of the Sandy Circuit Court, Mark Ethington presiding as Judge pro 
tern. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ethington took the matter 
under advisement. An unsigned document, on Fifth Circuit Court letterhead, 
dated December 21, 1987, was apparently prepared with the intent that it 
serve as the Court's "written opinion." (This document is reproduced in the 
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Addendum, infra, at A-12.) The Small Claims Judgment was entered on 
December 21, 1987, over the signature of Judge Ethington. (A copy of this 
Judgment is reproduced in the Addendum, infra, at A-14.) This Judgment was 
originally dated November 18, 1987, that date was crossed out and replaced 
with December 17, 1987, and that date was eventually crossed out and 
replaced with the date of December 21,1987. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In April of 1986, Plaintiffs, two Sandy City policemen doing 
business as "K.B. Enterprises," sold a piece of construction equipment to 
Defendant.1 Defendant never signed any written agreement because the 
contract that Plaintiffs drafted failed to reflect accurately the terms of the 
transaction. It was not disputed that the sale was based upon twenty-four 
(24) monthly payments of $324.64, which Defendant was to make directly to 
Plaintiffs' bank. The bank held a security interest in the piece of equipment 
and Plaintiffs' unpaid balance to the bank, at all times, significantly exceeded 
the aggregate of all payments agreed to be made by Defendant. In other 
words, the Plaintiffs had a substantial negative equity in the piece of 
equipment. 
Between the date of the contract and July of 1987, and therefore 
prior to the default at issue, Defendant twice tendered full payment of the 
1Pursuant to this Court's Administrative Order No. 1, dated April 7, 
1987, and paragraph 2(H)(1) thereof in particular, Appellant relies upon the 
audio recording of the proceedings in the trial court in order to avoid the 
cost of a transcript. This procedure appears to preclude, as a practical 
matter, citation to the trial transcript. 
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remaining balance due to Plaintiffs; however, Plaintiffs rejected these tenders, 
apparently because they could not provide clear title to the equipment, since 
they owed their bank far more than they had agreed to accept in total from 
the Defendant. It was the Plaintiffs' testimony at trial that the Defendant 
was consistently 60 to 90 days late in making his monthly payments and the 
Defendant acknowledged that he was often late during the winter months, 
during which there was no use for the equipment and his income was 
diminished. 
It was undisputed at trial that all payments becoming due through 
and including the June 10, 1987, payment were, in fact, paid by the Defendant 
but it was also undisputed that the Defendant had not paid the July 10, 1987, 
payment by August 14, 1987. Although they had no written documentation 
and, therefore, could have no perfected security interest, the Plaintiffs 
proceeded by self-help to "repossess" the equipment on August 14, 1987. At 
no time did Plaintiffs return or tender the return of the equipment to 
Defendant. 
The small claims judge awarded Plaintiffs judgment for $649.28, 
apparently under the belief that Plaintiffs were entitled to retain the property 
that they had sold to Defendant and hold Defendant liable for all payments 
coming due under the verbal contract prior to the date of the "repossession." 
The small claims judge, a former Sandy City Prosecutor, informed 
the Defendant that he was personally acquainted with both Plaintiffs. The 
judge affirmatively asserted, however, that he thought he could be fair. The 
judge had prosecuted several criminal cases incident to which the Plaintiffs 
appeared as chief prosecution witnesses and had thus acted in the role of 
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counsel for the Plaintiffs. Defendant inquired if the matter could be raised 
on appeal and was essentially assured that it could be. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since the pro tern had previously represented the Plaintiffs in 
court, in that they had appeared as his chief witnesses in cases in which he 
appeared as Sandy City Prosecutor, the pro tern committed clear error by 
failing to recuse himself. 
Plaintiffs sold the equipment to Defendant on the basis of a verbal 
agreement. There was no written retention of a security interest and, 
therefore, Plaintiffs held no security interest in the property. Accordingly, 
the pro tern erred in sanctioning Plaintiffs' self-help enforcement of a non-
existent security interest. 
It was undisputed at trial that Defendant had frequently been 60 to 
90 days late in his payments. The Plaintiffs had consistently accepted these 
late payments. Without any advance notice to Defendant, Plaintiffs then 
suddenly proceeded to "repossess" the equipment at a time when the payment 
was only one month and four days late. Under these circumstances, the trial 
judge erred in failing to recognize that the Plaintiffs were estopped by their 
consistent acceptance of late payments from "repossessing" the equipment 
without advance warning. Moreover, Defendant had at least twice tendered 
full payment of all amounts still due to the Plaintiffs but these offers had 
been rejected by the Plaintiffs, apparently because they could not secure 
clear title to the equipment because they owed far more to their bank on a 
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loan secured by the equipment than they had agreed to accept from 
Defendant. 
Finally, even assuming arguendo the existence of a valid security 
agreement, the trial court erred in awarding what amounts to a deficiency 
judgment since there had been no commercially reasonable sale of the 
collateral following its "repossession." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE JUDGE PRO TEM COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR BY 
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF. 
In a small claims action, it is generally accepted that the 
procedures are somewhat informal to accommodate the parties' pro se 
appearances. As a practical matter, the small claims judge must evaluate the 
facts and apply the law to those facts, whether or not the parties use the 
appropriate legal terms. The small claims judges must adhere to the 
applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and, in the context of 
the small claims setting, must be extraordinarily conscientious in informing 
the parties of their procedural rights. 
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, provides: 
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All His Activities. 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and 
should conduct himself at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
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B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other 
relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his 
office to advance the private interests of others; nor 
should he convey or permit others to convey the 
impression that they are in a special position to 
influence him . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Canon 3 more specifically provides: 
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office 
Impartially and Diligently. 
In the performance of [judicial] duties, the following 
standards apply: 
C. Disqualification 
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a 
proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning 
a party, . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, familiar to attorneys but not 
generally to pro se parties, provides at Rule 63 an avenue for the petition of 
judicial disqualification upon an affidavit of bias. It is not a decision to be 
made by the judge against whom the affidavit was filed. Rule 63 requires 
another judge of the same court or a court of like jurisdiction to determine 
the legal sufficiency of the affidavit of bias. Furthermore, the spirit of the 
essential need for an unbiased judiciary is expressed by the legislature in 
Section 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), as follows: 
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Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge 
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any 
action or proceeding: 
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is 
interested. 
(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for either 
party in the action or proceeding. 
If not by its terms mandating the judge's recusal in this instance, the spirit 
of the statute, the Rule, and the Canons set forth above clearly demonstrate 
that the pro tern should have recused himself from this case. 
In this instance, the judge was not only acquainted with Plaintiffs 
but also knew that Plaintiffs were quite familiar with the court procedures 
and effective presentation of their case. They had immediate rapport and 
credibility with the judge. The judge affirmatively stated that he believed he 
could be unbiased and assured Mr. Baker, or at least led Mr. Baker to believe, 
that if the judge was in fact biased, the matter could be dealt with on 
appeal. At best, this case demonstrates why even the appearance of 
impropriety necessitates recusal: Since the pro tern ruled in favor of 
Plaintiffs with no discernable legal basis whatsoever, his decision appears, 
particularly to lay persons, to be the product of bias. This constitutes 
clear, reversible error. 
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POINT II: THE COURT ERRED IN SANCTIONING PLAINTIFFS5 SELF-
HELP "REPOSSESSION." 
Once property is sold by one party to the other, the seller retains 
no interest in the property without an express agreement between the parties. 
A security interest could have been retained in the property sold by Plaintiff 
only under Section 70A-9-101, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). Specifically, Section 70A-9-203 provides: 
Security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or 
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not 
attach unless 
(a) . . . the debtor has signed a security 
agreement which contains a description of the collateral 
It is undisputed that there was no written agreement between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant. It is also undisputed that Plaintiffs, without Defendant's 
permission, retook possession of the property, depriving Defendant of is use. 
This is clearly in violation of the law and, in fact, constitutes at least 
conversion. 
Since there was no written contract in this case, as required by 
Sections 70A-2-2-1 and 70A-9-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), 
there could be no security interest as defined in Section 70A-1-201(37), Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). While the "savings" provision of Section 
70A-2-201(3), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), may allow the 
enforceability of a verbal contract, it does not supercede Section 70A-9-203, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), nor does it sanction the enforcement 
of a non-existent security interest. 
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Without a security interest, Plaintiffs' remedy is to sue Defendant 
for a breach of the agreement to pay and then enforce that money judgment. 
Without a security interest, Plaintiffs had no claim to the property. The 
court erred in sanctioning this illegal behavior by failing to dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint, so that it might have been refiled n a court having jurisdiction to 
order the return of Defendant's property.2 
POINT III: THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO ASSERT 
DEFENDANT'S TECHNICAL DEFAULT UNDER THE VERBAL 
CONTRACT. 
The contract at issue was entered into in April of 1986. It is 
undisputed that, from the beginning, Defendant had been sporadic in his 
payments without significant complaint from Plaintiffs. Defendant did, 
however, routinely make large payments and was current through June 10, 
1987. In fact, he had paid the equivalent of 14 of the 24 payments due under 
the agreement. Although Defendant had not made the July 10, 1987, and 
August 10, 1987, payments when Plaintiffs wrongfully took possession of the 
property on August 14, 1987, Defendant had no reason to believe that 
Plaintiffs would not accept payment as usual when he was able to pay. 
Where a seller has routinely tolerated a buyer's default, the seller 
waives strict compliance with the contract terms and must give notice before 
2The jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court is limited to the awarding of 
money damages. (Section 78-6-l(l)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended).) 
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demanding strict compliance. This rule was applied by the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980). There, 
the parties had contracted for Plaintiff to purchase a parcel of real property 
from Defendants and the parties had specified specific contract terms. The 
contract price was $40,000.00 with a down payment of $500.00, which payment 
was made. When the first payment of $14,500.00 came due on May 1, 1977, it 
was not paid. The parties discussed the purchaser's difficulty in obtaining 
financing and in approximately June, 1977, the Defendant contacted an agent 
for the purchaser and informed the agent that the check for the down 
payment had been lost. A subsequent check for the down payment, plus 
interest on the past due installment, was sent to the Defendant seller and the 
seller made no complaint. Various discussions continued and in December of 
1977, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant to discuss financing problems and 
the Defendant again represented that additional interest would be accruing 
during the period of the delay. In February of 1978, the Plaintiff contacted 
the Defendant to inform him that financing had been obtained, only to learn 
that the Defendant had arranged for the sale of the property to another 
purchaser. The trial court found that the Defendant had waived the 
requirement of strict compliance with the dates of payment set forth in the 
earnest money agreement and that the waiver had been relied upon by the 
Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's application of the 
rule that after a waiver of strict compliance, "the seller must give notice and 
a reasonable time to perform before he may insist upon holding the buyer 
strictly to the time requirements." 612 P.2d at 347 (footnote citations 
omitted). 
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Under the facts presented by the Plaintiffs here, they clearly had 
not given Defendant appropriate notice of their intent to declare him in 
default. Moreover, it is undisputed that at least in December of 1986 and 
again in July of 1987, Defendant attempted to pay the obligation in full, but 
these offers had been rejected by Plaintiffs, apparently because they could 
not secure title to the equipment. The Plaintiffs owed more to their bank on 
a loan secured by the equipment than they had agreed to accept from the 
Defendant. Consequently, it was clearly in Plaintiffs' economic interest to 
accept as many payments as possible from Defendant while retaining title to 
the equipment. It was not until the Defendant had paid the sum of $4,544.96 
and had a balance remaining of only $3,246.40 that Plaintiffs chose to 
"repossess." It is highly inequitable that the Defendants consistently allowed 
late payments and refused tender of the entire balance, and then, without 
notice, took possession of the property under the guise of Defendant's 
default. 
POINT IV: EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS HAD A VALID SECURITY 
INTEREST, THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN AWARDING MONEY 
DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS. 
Assuming, arguendo, the existence of a valid security agreement, 
the trial court erred in awarding what amounts to a deficiency judgment. 
After repossession, a secured creditor may either retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation as provided in Section 70A-9-505(2), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), or the creditor may sell the 
collateral and seek a deficiency judgment from the debtor pursuant to Section 
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70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). However, if the creditor 
seeks a deficiency judgment, the collateral must be sold and the sale must be 
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In this case, a deficiency 
judgment was absolutely inappropriate, as no commercially reasonable sale 
whatsoever had occurred. In fact, no sale of the property had occurred at 
all. It is undisputed that at the time of trial, the Plaintiffs retained 
possession of the equipment. 
As Plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of Section 
70A-9-504 and 505(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), even if this 
court should find a valid security agreement, the lower court's award of a 
money judgment is inappropriate and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judge pro tern erred in failing to recuse himself in this action, 
since he had previously represented the Plaintiffs in court. The trial court's 
judgment must be reversed because of the pro tern's failure to recuse himself. 
There was no written contract governing the sale of the property 
by Plaintiffs to Defendant. Plaintiffs retained no security interest in the 
property. The trial court erred in sanctioning Plaintiffs' self-help 
enforcement of a non-existent security interest. 
Defendant had consistently been late in making his payments to 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had made no demand upon Defendant for payment prior 
to retaking possession of the equipment. The trial court erred in failing to 
recognize that, as a result of their consistent acceptance of late payments, 
the Plaintiffs were estopped from "repossessing" the equipment without 
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advance warning to Defendant. Moreover, Defendant had twice tendered full 
payment of the balance due. 
Finally, even if this Court finds the existence of a valid security 
interest, the trial court erred in awarding a deficiency judgment against 
Defendant, since there was no commercial reasonable sale of the collateral 
following its "repossession" by Plaintiffs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of March, 1988. 
PARKEN & "KECK 
By \ \ # : _^  jr 
M h D . i y ^ n 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Original signature 
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CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Approved by the Supreme Court of Utafy, March 1, 1974 
CANON 2 
A Judge Should Avoid 
Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All His Activities 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should con&iict 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, oir other relationships to 
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. Me should not lend the 
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor 
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify 
voluntarily as a character witness. 
CANON 3 
A Judge Should Perform 
the Duties of His Office Impartially 
and Diligently 
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other 
activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed 
by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. He should be unswayeq by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum, in proceedings before 
him 
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his 
official capacity, and should require similir conduct of lawyers, 
2nd of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction 
and control. 
A- l 
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider 
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a dis-
interested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him 
if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the 
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond. 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. 
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or 
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making 
public statements in the course of their official duties or from 
explaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking 
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto 
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that 
a judge may authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation 
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes 
of judicial administration; 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of inves-
* titive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; 
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of 
appropriate court proceedings. 
B. Administrative Responsibilities 
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibili-
ties, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and 
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilites of 
other judges and court officials. 
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his 
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and dili-
gence that apply to him. 
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures 
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the 
judge may become aware. 
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should 
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoid-
ing nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation 
of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
C. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing; 
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(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy] or a lawyer with 
whom he previously practiced law served during such association 
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judgjs or such lawyer 
has been a material witness concerning it; 
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary,! or his spouse or 
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest 
in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceed-
ing, or any other interest that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person; 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in 
the proceeding; 
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 
inform himself 
land minor chil-
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to 
about the personal financial interests "of his spouse 
dren residing in his household. 
(3) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according]to the civil law 
system; 
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executoij, administrator, 
trustee, and guardian; 
(c) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal 6r equitable in-
terest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or 
other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that 
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities 
unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; 
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, 
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities 
held by the organization; 
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder ih a mutual in-
surance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings associa-
tion, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" 
in the organization only if the outcome of ihe proceeding 
could substantially affect the value of the interest; 
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" 
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could 
substantially affect the value of the securities. 
D. Remittal of Disqualification. 
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose 
on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, base l^ on such dis-
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78-7-1. Disqualification for interest or relation to 
parties. 
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge 
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any 
action or proceeding: 
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is int-
erested. 
(2) When he is related to either party by consan-
guinity or affinity within the third degree, computed 
according to the rules of the common law. 
(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for 
either party in the action or proceeding. 
But the provisions of this section shall not apply 
to the arrangement of the calendar or the regulation 
of the order of business, nor to the power of tran-
sferring the action or proceeding to some other 
COUrt. 1953 
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Rule 63. Disability or disqualificatioiti of a judge. 
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge 
before whom an action has been tried is unable o^ perform the duties to be 
performed by the court under these rules after a (verdict is returned or find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly 
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform 
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those 
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may 
in his discretion grant a new trial. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil 
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file in affidavit that the judge 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or 
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in 
another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is Known. If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to 
another iudee (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, 
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the 
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does nbt question the legal suffi-
ciency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds 
that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be (tailed in to try the case or 
determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to file 
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompa-
nied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are 
made in good faith. 
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70A-2-201. Formal requirements - Statute of 
frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a 
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 
or more is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to 
indicate that a contract for sale has been made 
between the parties and signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized 
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient 
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed 
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this 
paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in 
such writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time 
a writing in confirmation of the contract and suffi-
cient against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it sati-
sfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such 
party unless written notice of objection to its cont-
ents is given within ten days after it is received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requir-
ements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other 
respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufact-
ured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to 
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business 
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is rece-
ived and under circumstances which reasonably 
indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made 
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture 
or commitments for their procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or other-
wise in court that a contract for sale was made, but 
the contract is not enforceable under this provision 
beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has 
been made and accepted or which have been rece-
ived and accepted (section 70A-2-606). i%5 
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70A-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of 
security interest - Proceeds, formal requisites. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 70A-4-
208 on the security interest of a collecting bank and 
section 70A-9-113 on a security interest arising 
under the chapter on sales, a security interest is not 
enforceable against the debtor or third partie^ with 
respect to the collateral and does not attach unless 
(a) the collateral is in the possession if the 
secured pany pursuant to agreement, or the debtor 
has signed a security agreement which contains a 
description of the collateral and in addition, I when 
the security interest covers crops growing or to be 
grown or timber to be cut, a description of th£ land 
concerned; and 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
(2) A security interest attaches when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the 
collateral. Attachment occurs as soon as all of the 
events specified in subsection (1) have taken place 
unless explicit agreement postpones the time of att-
aching. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed a security agreement 
gives the secured party the rights to proceeds prov-
ided by section 70A-9-306. 
(4) A transaction, although subject to this 
chapter, is also subject to the Utah Uniform (tons-
umer Credit Code, and in the case of conflict 
between the provisions of this chapter and the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the provisions of 
the latter statute control. Failure to comply with any 
applicable statute has only the effect which is Spec-
ified therein. ism 
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70A-1-201. General definitions. 
Subject to additional definitions contained in the 
subsequent chapters of this act which are applicable 
to specific chapters or parts thereof, and unless the 
:ontext otherwise requires, in this act: 
(1) "Action" in the sense of a judicial proceeding 
includes recoupment, counterclaim, setoff, suit in 
equity and any other proceedings in which rights are 
determined. 
(2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to 
resort to a remedy. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties 
in fact as found in their language or by implication 
from other circumstances including course of 
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance 
as provided in this act (sections 70A-1-205 and 
70A-2-208). Whether an agreement has legal 
consequences is determined by the provisions of this 
act, if applicable; otherwise by the law of contracts 
(section 70A-1-103). (Compare "Contract.") 
(4) "Bank" means any person engaged in the 
business of banking. 
(5) "Bearer" means the person in possession of an 
instrument, document of title, or security payable to 
bearer or indorsed in blank. 
(6) "Bill of lading" means a document evidencing 
the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person 
engaged in the business of transporting or forwar-
ding goods, and includes an airbill. "Airbill" means 
a document serving for air transportation as a bill 
of lading does for marine or rail transportation, and 
includes an air consignment note or air waybill. 
(7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated 
foreign branch of a bank. 
(8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the 
burden of persuading the triers of fact that the exi-
stence of the fact is more probable than its nonexi-
stence. 
(9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means 
a person who in good faith and without knowledge 
that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership 
rights or security interest of a third party in the 
goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the 
business of selling goods of that kind but does not 
include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals 
or the like (including oil and gas) at wellhead or 
minehead shall be deemed to be persons in the 
business of selling goods of that kind. "Buying* 
may be for cash or by exchange of other property or 
on secured or unsecured credit and includes recei-
ving goods or documents of title under a pre-
existing contract for sale but does not include a 
transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or 
partial satisfaction of a money debt. 
(10) "Conspicuous": A term or clause is conspic-
uous when it is so written that a reasonable person 
against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed 
it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NONNEGOT-
IABLE BILL OF LADING) is conspicuous. Lang-
uage in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is 
in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a 
telegram any stated term is "conspicuous." Whether 
a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for dec-
ision by the court. 
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation 
which results from the parties' agreement as affe-
cted by this act and any other applicable rules of 
law. (Compare "Agreement.") 
(12) "Creditor" includes a general creditor, a 
secured creditor, a lien creditor and any represent-
ative of creditors, including an assignee for the 
benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a rec-
eiver in equity and an executor or administrator of 
an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate. 
(13) "Defendant" includes a person in the position 
of defendant in a cross-action or counterclaim. 
(14) "Delivery" with respect to instruments, doc-
uments of title, chattel paper or securities means 
voluntary transfer of possession. 
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading, 
dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt or 
order for the delivery of goods, and also any other 
document which in the regular course of business or 
financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the 
person in possession of it is entitled to receive, hold 
and dispose of the document and the goods it 
covers. To be a document of title a document must 
purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and 
purport to cover goods in the bailee's possession 
which are either identified or are fungible portions 
of an identified mass. 
(16) "Fault" means wrongful act, omission or 
breach. 
(17) "Fungible" with respect to goods or securities 
means goods or securities of which any unit is, by 
nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other 
like unit. Goods which are not fungible shall be 
deemed fungible for the purposes of this act to the 
extent that under a particular agreement or docu-
ment unlike units are treated as equivalents. 
(18) "Genuine" means free of forgery or counte-
rfeiting. 
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the 
conduct or transaction concerned. 
(20) "Holder" means a person who is in posses-
sion of a document of title or an instrument or an 
investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him 
or to his order oir to bearer or in blank. 
(21) To "honor" is to pay or to accept and pay, 
or where a credit so engages to purchase or discount 
a draft complying with the terms of the credit. 
(22) "Insolvency proceedings" includes any assig-
nment for the benefit of creditors or other procee-
dings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate 
of the person involved. 
(23) A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased 
to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business 
or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is 
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankr-
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uptcy law. 
(24) "Money" means a medium of exchange aut-
horized or adopted by a domestic or foreign gover-
nment as a part of its currency. 
(25) A person has "notice"' of a fact when 
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or 
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; 
or 
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known 
to him at the time in question he has reason to 
know that it exists. 
A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact 
when he has actual knowledge of it. "Discover" or 
"learn" or a word or phrase of similar import refers 
to knowledge rather than to reason to know. The 
time and circumstances under which a notice or 
notification may cease to be effective are not dete-
rmined by this act. 
(26) A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or 
notification to another by taking such steps as may 
be reasonably required to inform the other in ordi-
nary course whether or not such other actually 
comes to know of it. A person "receives" a notice or 
notification when 
(a) it comes to his attention; or 
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business 
through which the contract was made or at any 
other place held out by him as the place for receipt 
of such communications. 
(27) Notice, knowledge of a notice or notification 
received by an organization is effective for a parti-
cular transaction from the time when it is brought 
to the attention of the individual conducting that 
transaction, and in any event from the time when it 
would have been brought to his attention if the 
organization had exercised due diligence. An orga-
nization exercises due diligence if it maintains reas-
onable routines for communicating significant inf-
ormation to the person conducting the transaction 
and there is reasonable compliance with the rout-
ines. Due diligence does not require an individual 
acting for the organization to communicate infor-
mation unless such communication is pan of his 
regular duties or unless he has reason to know of 
the transaction and that the transaction would be 
materially affected by the information. 
(28) "Organization" includes a corporation, gov-
ernment or governmental subdivision or agency, 
business trust, estate, trust, partnership or associa-
tion, two or more persons having a joint or 
common interest, or any other legal or commercial 
entity. . . . . . . 
(29) "Party,", as distinct from "third party," 
means a person who has engaged in a transaction or 
made an agreement within this act. 
(30) "Person" includes an individual or an orga-
nization (See section 70A-1-102). ' 
(31) "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the 
trier of fact must find the existence of the fact pre-
sumed unless and until evidence is introduced which 
would support a finding of its nonexistence. 
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, 
negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or re-
issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction crea-
ting an interest in property. 
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by 
purchase. 
(34) "Remedy" means any remedial right to which 
an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort 
to a tribunal. 
(35) "Representative" includes an agent, an officer 
of a corporation or association, and a trustee, exe-
cutor or administrator of an estate, or any other 
person empowered to act for another. 
(36) "Rights" includes remedies. 
(37) "Security interest" means an interest in pers-
onal property or fixtures which secures payment or 
performance of an obligation. The retention or 
reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithsta-
nding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 70A-
2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a 
"security interest." The term also includes any inte-
rest of a buyer of account or chattel paper which is 
subject to chapter 9 The special property interest of 
a buyer of goods on identification of such goods to 
a contract for sale under section 70A-2-401 is not 
a "security interest,7 but a buyer may also acquire a 
"security interest" by complying with chapter 9. 
Unless a lease or consignment is intended as secu-
rity, reservation of title thereunder is not a "security 
interest" but a consignment is in any event subject 
to the provisions on consignment sales (section 70A-
2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to 
be determined by the facts of each case; however, 
(a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does 
not of itself make tpe lease one intended for secu-
rity, and 
(b) an agreement that upon compliance with the 
terms of the lease the lessee snail become or has the 
option to become the owner of the property for no 
additional consideration or for a nominal consider-
ation does make the lease one intended for security. 
(38) "Send" in connection with any writing or 
notice means to deposit in the mail or deliver for 
transmission by any other usual means of commu-
nication with postage or cost of transmission prov-
ided for and properly addressed and in the case of 
an instrument to an address specified thereon or 
otherwise agreed, or if there be none to any address 
reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of 
any writing or noticje within the time at which it 
would have arrived if properly sent has the effect of 
a proper sending. 
(39) "Signed" includes any symbol executed-or 
adopted by a party yith present intention to authe-
nticate a writing. 
(40) "Surety" includes guarantor. 
(41) "Telegram" includes a message transmitted by 
radio, teletype, cable, any mechanical method of 
transmission, or the like. 
(42) "Term" means that portion of an agreement 
which relates to a particular matter. 
(43) "Unauthorized" signature or indorsement 
means one made without actual, implied or apparent 
authority and includes a forgery. ' 
(44) "Value." Except as otherwise provided with 
respect to negotiable instruments and bank collect-
ions (sections 70A-B-303, 70A-4-208 and 70A-
4-209) a person gives "value" for rights if he acq-
uires them 
(a) in return for a binding commitment to 
extend credit or for the extension of immediately 
available credit whether or not drawn upon and 
whether or not a chajge-back is provided for in the 
event of difficulties in collection; or 
(b) as security for or in total or partial satisfa-
ction of a pre-existing claim; or 
(c) by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-
existing contract for purchase; or 
(d) generally, in return for any consideration 
sufficient to support a simple contract. 
(45) "Warehouse receipt" means a receipt issued 
by a person engaged i^ i the business of storing goods 
for hire. 
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70A-9-504. Secured party's right to dispose of 
collateral after default - Effect of disposition. 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or 
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its 
then condition or following any commercially reas-
onable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods 
is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2). The 
proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order 
following to 
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, 
holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing 
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the 
agreement and not prohibited by law, the reasonable 
attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred by ' the 
secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured.by 
the security interest under which the disposition is 
made; -
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured.by 
any subordinate security interest in the collateral if 
written notification of demand therefor is received 
before distribution of the proceeds is completed. If 
requested by the secured party, the holder of < a 
subordinate security interest must seasonably furnish 
reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does 
so, the secured party need not comply, with , his 
demand. 
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, 
the secured party must account to the debtor.;for 
any surplus, and, ..unless otherwise , agreed, the 
debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the unde-
rlying transaction was a sale of accounts o r chattel 
paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus o r : i s 
liable for any deficiency only if the security.agree-
ment so provides. 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public 
or private proceedings and may be made by way of 
one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may 
be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place 
and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless 
collateral is perishable or threatens to decline spee-
dily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the 
time and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the time after which any private sale 
or other intended disposition is to be made shall be 
sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not 
signed after default a statement renouncing or 
nodifying his right to notification of sale. In the 
case of consumer goods no other notification need 
be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to 
any other secured party from whom the secured 
party has received (before sending his notification to 
the debtor or before the debtor's renunciation of his 
rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the 
collateral. The secured party may buy at any public 
sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily 
sold in a recognized market or is of a type which is 
the subject of widely distributed standard price 
quotations he may buy at private sale. 
(4) When collateral is disposed of by a secured 
party after default, the disposition transfers to a 
purchaser for value all of the debtor ' s rights 
therein, discharges the security interest under which 
it is made and any security interest or lien subordi-
nate thereto. The purchaser takes free of all such 
rights and interests even though the secured party 
fails to comply with the requirements of this part or 
of any judicial proceedings 
(a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser 
has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if 
he does not buy in collusion with the secured party, 
other bidders or the person conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in 
good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party 
under a guaranty, indorsement, repurchase agree-
ment or the like and who receives a transfer of col-
lateral from the secured party or is subrogated to his 
rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the 
secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a 
sale or disposition of the collateral under this 
chapter. 1977 
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70A-9-505. Compulsory disposition of collateral 
- Acceptance of the collateral as discharge of 
obligation. 
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the 
cash price in the case of a purchase money security 
interest in consumer goods or sixty per cent of the 
loan in the case of another security interest in con-
sumer goods, and has not signed after default a 
statement renouncing or modifying his rights under 
this pan a secured party who has taken possession 
of collateral must dispose of it under section 70A-9-
504 and if he fails to do so within ninety days after 
he takes possession the debtor at his option may 
recover in conversion or under section 70A-9-
507(1) on secured party's liability. 
(2) In any other case involving consumer goods or 
any other collateral a secured party in possession 
may, after default, propose to retain the collateral 
in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of 
such proposal shall be sent to the debtor if he has 
not signed after default a statement renouncing or 
modifying his rights under this subsection. In the 
case of consumer goods no other notice need be 
given. In other cases notice shall be sent to any 
other secured party from whom the secured party 
has received (before sending his notice to the debtor 
or before the debtor's renunciation of his rights) 
written notice of a claim of an interest in the colla-
teral. If the secured party receives objection in 
writing from a person entitled to receive notification 
within 21 days after the notice was sent, the secured 
party must dispose of the collateral under section 
70A-9-504. In the absence of such written obje-
ction the secured party may retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debtor's obligation. 
(3) The above subsection shall not apply to pled-
gees receiving pledged property in the regular course 
of business where the consideration received by the 
pledgor for the property pledged is less than S100. 
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Written Opinion: K-B Enterprises v. Baker Construction. 
At the trial in this matter the defendant argued that, pursuant to subsection 
(1) of section 70A-1-206 of the Utah Code, a written contract was required 
in this matter and as there was no written contract the plaintiff has no cause 
of action. It is the finding of the court that- section 70A-1-206 -'is not 
determinative of this case. Subsection (2) of section 70A-1-206 provides 
that, "subsection (1) of this section does not apply to contracts for the 
sale of goods..." Goods are defined in section 70A-2-105(l) as "all 
things...which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract..." 
The bobcat in question was moveable so it would fall within the definition 
of goods. 
It appears instead that section 70A-2-201 is controlling subsection (1) of 
section 70A-2-201 provides that, "except as"otherwise provided in this section 
a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not 
enforceable...unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a 
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought..." Subsection (3) then provides that: 
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) 
but which is valid in other respects is enforceable... 
(a) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits 
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract for sale was made... 
(b) with respect to goods for which payment has been made 
and accepted or which have been received and accepted. 
It is the finding of the court that the defendant admitted in court that 
a contract for sale had been made and that payments were made for the 
bobcat, it was delivered-to the defendant and he accepted it. Thus, 
there was a valid and enforceable contract between the parties. The 
defendant breached that contract by defaulting on his payments, and 
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judgement is granted in the plaintiff's favor. 
The next issue is the amount of damages the defendant is liable for. The 
defendant is liable for the two payments of $324.64 that were in default. 
When a payment is in default, the seller is entitled to recover that 
payment no matter when repossession took place. However, the defendant 
is only liable for damages that are reasonably foreseeable, and it is the 
finding of the court that the $500.00 refinancing 
was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence at default 
charge to the plaintiff 
Judgement will be granted in favor of the plaintiff in the amount fo $649.28. 
No costs will be awarded. 
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\yp Merpri^ Plaintiff 
vs. 
Defendant 
This matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavi 
served with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defend, and 
following parties appeared at the hearing: 
SMALL CLAIMS 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 
of plaintiff, and the defendant has been 
eturn of service has been made. The 
• Plaintiff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set, and the defendant's default has been 
entered. 
K 
DATED 
Both plaintiff and defendant appeared and presented evidence. 
$ / ? HCh Z 9 Principal 
$ C2 Court costs, and 
$ f ytf . Z X ^ TDTAI .IIIDfiMFNIT 
'&$&> £' Jm JUDGE 
% 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at Hearing. 
TO THE DEFENDANT ONLY: 
If the above judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in 
the Circuit Court in the amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied v/ith this judgment, you have only 
FIVE (5) DAYS fronrvroooipt-of this notice to appeal the case to the District Court. 
TO THE PLAINTIFF ONLY: 
You should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five 
days frorrue&etpt-of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the 
original of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action. 
eby certify I her that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above 
named defendant(s) at 
I,
 A Address &Jffi ^mj^ * / x 
.
 / 0 r , ,„,„,. DatefL 
V \ SIGNATURE 
rt\W n. wr 
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